10_SEBBA_BP (DO NOT DELETE)

3/19/2013 5:54 PM

IS SENTENCING REFORM
A LOST CAUSE?
A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE ON
CONCEPTUAL PROBLEMS IN
SENTENCING RESEARCH
LESLIE SEBBA*
For Nietzsche, we are more likely to engage in the development of “semiotic fictions”
that provide us with an illusory state of understanding and mastery of the universe. He
has emphasized that rather than search for the “truth” resting on Logos, the search for
a seemingly underlying logic, rationality, and certainty, we should focus on Pathos—
1
struggle, contradiction, the unexpected, surprise, and the emergent.

I
PROLOGUE: AN ANECDOTE
After a period of studying and working in Israel in the early 1960s, I was
employed as a Research Officer in the English Home Office Research Unit at a
time when the British government was contemplating the adoption of the
suspended sentence of imprisonment as a means for stemming the tide of an
increasing prison population. Israel, which on gaining independence in 1948 had
inherited a criminal justice system based on the English model, had introduced
a similar reform a few years earlier. On the basis of a somewhat rudimentary
examination of the statistical data on the sentencing practices of the Israeli
courts (broken down by court level and type of offense) during the years prior
to and following their reform, I reached the following conclusions: “The
assumption that custodial rates would decrease was borne out. They were in
fact reduced to less than half their previous level . . . . They were reduced in
both district courts and magistrates’ courts, and for almost every category of
2
offence.”
Copyright © 2013 by Leslie Sebba.
This article is also available at http://lcp.law.duke.edu/.
 Institute of Criminology, Faculty of Law, Hebrew University of Jerusalem. This article is based
on a paper delivered in January 2012 at the Research Workshop of the Israel Science Foundation on
“The Effects of Different Sentencing Reforms.” Thanks are due to Oren Gazal-Ayal and his colleagues
for its organization, to the guest editor and external reviewer of Law and Contemporary Problems, to
my colleagues David Weisburd and Mike Shalev for some comments on the use of statistics, and to
Noam Haviv for some bibliographical suggestions. Parts of part IV originated in a paper included in a
Festschrift for Shlomo Shoham (circulated privately). The present title owes its inspiration to Andrew
Ashworth, Is the Criminal Law a Lost Cause?, 116 L.Q.R. 225 (2000).
1. Dragan Milovanovic, Introduction, in CHAOS, CRIMINOLOGY AND SOCIAL JUSTICE: THE NEW
ORDERLY (DIS)ORDER, at viii (Dragan Milovanovic ed., 1997).
2. Leslie Sebba, Penal Reform and Court Practice: The Case of the Suspended Sentence, in
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The positive outcome of the Israeli reform might have been attenuated if
large numbers of suspended sentences had subsequently been activated
following the commission of a further offense during the suspension period. But
3
activation rates did not prove to be high. On this occasion, in an apparent
reversal of the usual pattern, Britain could learn from the Israeli experience. I
therefore drafted a position paper for the Home Office extolling the potential
of using suspended sentences to reduce imprisonment. While I have no
knowledge of the weight, if any, given to my position paper in the formulation
of the British government’s policy, the reform was incorporated in the
4
subsequent legislation—the Criminal Justice Act of 1967. Its main purpose,
5
more explicitly than in Israel, was to avoid using imprisonment. To ensure this
would be the outcome rather than “net-widening” (whereby new softer
sanctions serve as additions to the use of prison sentences rather than replacing
them), a rule was introduced (first by the Court of Appeal, later by statute) to
ensure that the suspended sentence would not serve as an alternative to noncustodial penalties:
[S]entencing courts must first consider and dismiss all non-custodial penalties (fine,
probation, etc.) as inappropriate, then decide that a sentence of imprisonment had to
be passed, fix the length of that sentence, and then and only then go on to ask whether
the sentence 6of imprisonment could legitimately be suspended in the particular
circumstances.

The outcome, however, was very different from that which was intended—
and indeed might have been anticipated on the basis of the Israeli experience.
There was “extremely strong inferential evidence that after 1967 the courts at
once used the suspended sentence not only in place of imprisonment, but also
7
where they would previously have imposed the fine or probation.” Moreover,
the English magistrates’ courts tended to impose longer terms than when
imposing immediate imprisonment. Further, because the activation rates for
breach of the conditions were high and the sentence for the new offense had to
be served consecutively with the activated sentences, reduction in prison
8
numbers was not achieved by the legislation. Although a detailed academic
analysis of these developments notes that the precise effects of the legislation

STUDIES IN CRIMINOLOGY 133, 150 (Israel Drapkin ed., 1969).
3. Id. at 150–51.
4. Criminal Justice Act, 1967, c. 80, § 39–42 (Eng.).
5. Cf. Anthony E. Bottoms, The Suspended Sentence in England, 1967–78, 21 BRIT. J.
CRIMINOLOGY 1, 2–4 (1981) (noting that some advocates of suspended sentences laid greater emphasis
on the individual deterrent qualities of this sentence).
6. Id. at 4. The rule was identified with the name of the Court of Appeal case in which the
principle was declared—R v. O’Keefe, [1969] 2 Q.B. 29—and was later incorporated into the Criminal
Justice Act, 1972, c. 71, § 11–14 (Eng.).
7. Bottoms, supra note 5, at 5.
8. Id. at 8.
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9

are disputed, its author adopted an unequivocal heading for his discussion of
10
these events: “The Failure of Legislative Intention.”
II
INTRODUCTION
The present article was intended as a review of the conceptual and
methodological issues arising in the course of sentencing research, particularly
in the context of the evaluation of sentencing reforms. One message that
appeared to emerge from the literature was the one reflected in the preceding
anecdote, pointing to the unanticipated outcomes of sentencing reform.
However, this message must be qualified owing to the uncertainty as to when
such “outcomes” can indeed be attributed to the reforms that preceded them,
given the methodological difficulties in attributing causal connection. Hence the
negative tone of the article’s title.
The problematic nature of sentencing research seems inherent in the
complexity of the sentencing process. Innumerable variables operating at both
the micro and the macro levels may affect both the sentencing process and the
outcomes of its reforms. Were there to be a metric on the complexity of social
institutions, sentencing would surely attract a high score as one of the more
complex, and thus difficult, to research.
There is an element of paradox in this observation, since the sentencing
decision is usually a rather brief event occurring within the framework of an
apparently highly structured process that in turn is governed by a panoply of
rules. Such a view of the sentencing process is, however, misleading. Sentencing
is a process that operates on many levels. In the first place it is the symbolic
process that gives expression to society’s ability to impose social order and
restrain the deviant. Secondly (and in large measure following from the
previous point), the imposition of punishment may also constitute, in a literal
sense, a communication to the general public, thereby attracting media interest.
Public attention may be enhanced by the frequently contested character of one
or other of the three main parameters of the sentencing decision: (a) its
declared objective (to deter, rehabilitate, et cetera), (b) the choice of penalty
selected (prison, fine, et cetera), and most particularly (c) its level of severity.
Thirdly and most practically, the sentencing decision (although generally
short and formalized) can be considered the lynchpin of the criminal justice
system connecting the punishment to the crime in both symbolic and practical
senses. At the same time, and of greater significance in the present context,

9. Id.
10. Id. Apparently, after a period of decline a revived form of the suspended sentence was
introduced in England in 2003 but, once again, it was found that “sentencers . . . are not always using it
for the intended purposes.” ANDREW ASHWORTH, SENTENCING AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 304 (5th ed.,
2010). Canadian research, however, which identifies this form of sentence as “community custody
sentence,” describes how Canada has successfully introduced such sentences for reducing prison
figures. See JULIAN ROBERTS, THE VIRTUAL PRISON 17 (2004).
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sentencing may be seen as the final result of a sometimes long-awaited outcome
of a process, the components of which may be difficult to identify and thus also
11
hard to research. While the sentence on a syllogistic Beccarian model should
be a necessary product of the offense and the legal provision applicable to it,
the sentencing literature draws attention to a wide array of variables potentially
affecting the sentencing decision, including judicial precedents, the
circumstances of the offense, the criminal antecedents of the offender, the
offender’s personality, circumstances, and socio-demographic characteristics,
the personality and socio-demographic characteristics of the judge,
prosecutorial and defense arguments, plea bargains, pre-sentence inquiry
reports, victim input and conduct, court culture, local opinion, public opinion,
and the media.
Identifying which among the preceding list of variables should be impacting
the sentencing decision and what weight each should carry is frequently in issue.
Views held as to the relevance and legitimacy of a particular variable will
depend on the purposes of sentencing deemed just and desirable and on the
way these purposes are seen to play out in individual cases. As will be
elaborated below, variations in the legitimacy attributed to a variable—whether
by the decision-maker or the critical researcher—will tend to reflect the
sentencing paradigm or ideology to which they adhere. The confusion
surrounding the issue of disparities (and the distinct but related concept of
discrimination) derives from ideological and interpretational issues no less than
from empirical ones.
The multiplicity of variables potentially impacting the sentence decision
(whether directly or indirectly) and the potential interactions between them,
together with value-laden questions relating to the legitimacy of such variables
in light of competing sentencing aims, undoubtedly contribute to a lack of
uniformity in the findings of evaluative research in this area. In spite of brave
attempts to research this area in Israel, an unequivocal answer could probably
not be given to the question raised in a comment on the government’s proposed
sentencing reform as to whether there was an empirical basis for the allegations
12
of sentencing disparities. And if researching the variables impacting sentencing
practice is problematic, the ability to evaluate the effects of penal reform in this
area is even more so: changes over time have to be measured and their causes
must be identified, which requires controlling for all the other potential factors
referred to above.
Moreover, where the object of consideration is sentencing reform (as
opposed merely to sentencing patterns), account must be taken of the possibly
diverse objectives of the reform, the dynamics of policymaking, and the

11. See infra Part III.
12. Anat Horovitz et al., Position Paper on the Proposal for Penal Law (Amendment 92—
Structuring Judicial Discretion in Sentencing), 5756-2006, at 2 (June 2006) (on file with author). For a
similar theme in relation to the federal sentencing guidelines in the United States, see KATE STITH &
JOSE CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING 104–42 (1998).
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relationship between the reform of the component of the criminal justice system
on which the reform is focused (in the present context, the sentencing process)
and the other components of this system, as well as wider aspects of the
13
relationship between legal and social change. Such contextual issues will
impact both the content of sentencing reforms and the manner of their
implementation.
The foregoing analysis suggests that the methodological problems inherent
14
in evaluating sentencing reforms are likely to be almost insuperable. To
measure the impact of the variables referred to within the judicial process, and
a fortiori of external institutions and underlying social processes (not to speak
of the interaction between these two sets of variables), presents an
overwhelming challenge. If evaluations of sentencing reforms give rise to
inconsistent results, this may be attributable to the aforementioned problems—
thereby compounding the unpredictability of the effects of the reforms
themselves.
The development of criminology in general, and penology in particular, may
be identified with the modernist project—or what David Garland has called
15
“penal welfarism.” Nineteenth and twentieth century scholars of the positivist
school were confident of their ability to progress consistently towards the goal
16
of an enlightened and reforming penal system; and, as indicated above, the
sentencing process is necessarily at the heart of this project. While reformist
ideas have generally been in retreat—or at least on the defensive—in the last
decades, the discourse of sentencing reform seems to be resilient. According to
Garland, both these developments are consistent with “late modernity,”
whereby comprehensive reintegrationist policies that characterized modernity
17
are replaced by ad hoc law enforcement initiatives.
The purpose of this article is to consider the numerous constraints—and the
resultant confusions—that constitute obstacles both to sentencing reform and
sentencing research. Some of these constraints and confusions are embedded in
the ambiguities of the concepts incorporated in the sentencing discourse,
including commonly used terms such as “disparities” (and “legal” and
“extralegal” variables), as well as fundamental penological concepts such as
“desert” and “severity.” The meanings of some of these concepts may change as
ideologies are replaced and new sentencing paradigms emerge, thereby

13. ROGER COTTERELL, THE SOCIOLOGY OF LAW: AN INTRODUCTION 44–70 (2d ed., 1992).
14. Cf. David Weisburd, Magic and Science in Multivariate Sentencing Models: Reflections on the
Limits of Statistical Methods, 35 ISR. L. REV. 225, 226, 238 (2001). The theme of the article is that “the
boundaries between science and magic are often blurred in sentencing research.” The author states,
“[I]n the end, the assumption of correct model specification challenges the validity of nearly every
sentencing study.”
15. DAVID GARLAND, PUNISHMENT AND WELFARE 231–64 (1985).
16. Id.; DAVID J. ROTHMAN, THE DISCOVERY OF THE ASYLUM: SOCIAL ORDER AND
DISORDER IN THE NEW REPUBLIC 294–95 (1971).
17. See David Garland, Penal Modernism and Postmodernism, in PUNISHMENT AND SOCIAL
CONTROL 45 (Thomas G. Blomberg & Stan Cohen eds., 2003); see infra Part VII.
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compounding the ambiguity inherent in the terminology. Other types of
constraint may derive from elements in the criminal justice system or the
sentencing process itself (“internal” constraints), or from political, cultural
pressures or other societal developments (“external” constraints). The
cumulative effect of these constraints is to raise doubts both as to the potential
for the adoption of meaningful sentencing reforms and for achieving accuracy in
their evaluation.
The following sections of the article will examine some of these issues in the
19
context of the two main sentencing paradigms that have guided reformers in
the era of modern penology and been the subject of sentencing research—the
20
positivist model and the “just deserts” model. Particular attention will be paid
to conceptual and research issues that have a bearing on contemporary work in
this field. This will be followed by some brief observations on the outcomes of
the researchers’ evaluations and their ability to address the issues raised. Since
one of the salient issues in sentencing has always been its severity, consideration
will be given (if only briefly) to the relevance of the contemporary literature on
penal punitiveness, its causes, and the potential for its control, in order to assess
its relevance for an understanding of sentencing policy and its evaluation. In
light of these analyses, the concluding section will consider how far the
anecdote with which the article opened, while portraying what has come to be
21
22
known as the issue of “transplants” or policy transfers, should be seen to
exemplify the field of sentencing policy. This section will also consider possible
theoretical frameworks for a better understanding of sentencing reform and the
sentencing process in the contemporary world.

18. The term “disparities” may connote differences that are unjustified, but for some writers this
attribution will require addition of the epithet “unwarranted.” Cf. STITH & CABRANES, supra note 12,
at 104–42. Similar ambiguity attaches to the term “extralegal variables,” given the uncertainty as to
which variables will be perceived as legally relevant under the alternative paradigms.
19. The different conceptual approaches to sentencing that have prevailed in different periods are
variously—but not necessarily accurately—described in the penological literature as “schools,”
“models,” “paradigms,” or “ideologies.” The term paradigm is helpful in the present context in
connoting Kuhn’s account of the manner in which a particular approach may dominate academic
thinking that may be slow to change even when faced with contradictory empirical evidence. On the
other hand, Kuhn was more concerned with scientific explanations of the (natural or social) world,
whereas sentencing “paradigms” (especially just deserts) may be more associated with policy and
ideology.
20. Less space will be devoted to Beccaria’s “classical” paradigm, since the sentencing practices
advocated therein—notably deterrence—were not, at the time, the subject of empirical research.
21. See generally ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS: AN APPROACH TO COMPARATIVE
LAW (1993).
22. CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND POLITICAL CULTURES: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL
DIMENSIONS OF CRIME CONTROL 3–7 (Tim Newburn & Richard Sparks eds., 2004).
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III
SENTENCING PARADIGMS
I have referred to the myriad factors that may influence the sentencing
decision. Sentencing, however, is a normative matter par excellence. Rather
than being the product of a chance combination of variables, sentencing should
be a reflection of the values and policies expressed in the legislation,
precedents, or guidelines that form the sentencing framework. By implication,
variables affecting sentencing will be legitimate if they give expression to the
intended values and policies, but may cease to be so in the event of changes in
the aims of sentencing.
The status of the various sentencing aims is generally evident at any given
time and place by virtue of the adherence of the dominant penological
discourse to a particular sentencing paradigm. The modern history of penology
and sentencing has been characterized by a succession of such paradigms, each
with its own clear rationale and implications for sentencing policy. Beccaria’s
paradigm, based on deterrence and the certainty and proportionality of
23
punishment, represented the views of the eighteenth century enlightenment
and the “classical school” of criminology. The second half of the nineteenth
century produced the birth of the social sciences and the positivist school, with
the new paradigm oriented towards treatment and the individualization of
24
punishment. Following the critique of the abuses of excessive discretion
25
26
inherent in this paradigm, with its potential for wide disparities in sentencing,
27
together with the alleged failure of rehabilitation as an achievable objective,
the individualization paradigm was in turn replaced by “just deserts.” Under
this paradigm, punishment would once again be proportional to the seriousness
of the offense, but now conceptually based on principles of retributivism rather
than the deterrence ideology of the classical school.
Such changes in the prevailing paradigm create problems for the researcher,
since, as we move from paradigm to paradigm, the key concepts of the
sentencing literature such as disparities, discrimination, and the differentiation
28
between “legal” and “extralegal” variables will change their meaning. The
adoption of a paradigm should, on the other hand, bring the benefits of clarity
and consistency. Uniformity or consistency of sentencing based upon the type
or seriousness of the offense would, under an individualized sentencing model,
23.
24.
25.
26.

CESARE BECCARIA, CRIMES AND PUNISHMENT (J.A. Farrer ed., 1880).
See RAYMOND SALEIILLES, THE INDIVIDUALIZATION OF PUNISHMENT (1911).
See, e.g., AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE COMMITTEE, STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE (1971).
This was particularly the case in the United States. See MARVIN FRANKEL, CRIMINAL
SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER (1972). On comparisons between the United States and Europe,
see Ely Aharonson, Determinate Sentencing and American Exceptionalism: The Underpinnings and
Effects of Cross-National Differences in the Regulation of Sentencing Discretion, 76 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS., no. 1, 2013 at 161; see also infra Part VII.
27. Robert Martinson, What Works? Questions and Answers about Prison Reform, 35 PUB.
INTEREST 22, 49 (1974).
28. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.

10_SEBBA_BP (DO NOT DELETE)

244

3/19/2013 5:54 PM

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 76:237

constitute a departure from the prevailing ideology, which links the sentence to
the rehabilitative needs of the individual offender. Radically differentiated
sentences for like offenses will, on the other hand, be entirely acceptable if the
personal circumstances warrant it.
Nevertheless, paradigms (as broadly conceived in the context of this
29
article), although helpful for conceptualization, are no more than ideal-types,
and specific policies and practices are likely to diverge from the prevailing
paradigm. Competing paradigms may co-exist over long periods, and hybrid
30
and compromise models may be adopted. Such mixed transformations,
coupled with the instability of the meaning attributed to such expressions as
disparity in sentencing, may cause confusion and hamper any attempt to
evaluate the effects of a reform.
A further dimension may be added if a sentencing paradigm based on
deontological aims is replaced by a consequentialist scheme or vice versa. To
evaluate a consequentialist sentencing aim, it will be necessary not only to
examine the decision-making practices of the courts, but also the subsequent
conduct of the convicted offender (as well as of law enforcement personnel) if
the purpose is rehabilitation or individual deterrence, or of the general public if
the objective is general deterrence—with the potential for an exponential
increase in the complexity of the research. However, although operating within
the positivist paradigm, the first significant group of sentencing researchers was
more modest in its objectives and focused on judicial decision-making.
IV
THE POSITIVIST PARADIGM
Positivism in criminology may be identified by some with etiological
31
theories based upon born criminality and stigmata, and with a penal system
characterized by the indeterminate sentence, uncontrolled discretion, and the
failed treatments and injustices exposed in such works as The Struggle for
32
Punishment. However, positivism also heralded the birth of criminological and
other societal research purporting to invoke “scientific” methods and to seek
the incorporation of research findings into social policy. Although the “just
deserts” paradigm in sentencing, which gave rise to the policies on which the
present symposium is focused, is perceived as anti-positivist from a
33
criminological perspective, positivist methodologies continue to guide much of
the accompanying research.

29. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
30. Cf. TED BENTON & IAN CRAIB, PHILOSOPHY OF SOCIAL SCIENCE 58–63 (2d ed. 2010).
31. RAYMOND PATERNOSTER & RONET BACHMAN, EXPLAINING CRIMINALS AND CRIME 47
(2001).
32. See AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE COMMITTEE, supra note 25; THOMAS BLOMBERG &
KAROL LUCKEN, AMERICAN PENOLOGY 66–68 (2000).
33. See Roger Hood, Penal Policy and Criminological Challenges in the New Millenium, 34 AUSTL.
& N.Z. J. CRIMINOLOGY 1 (2001). A legal perspective may lead to a different conclusion, since desert
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The positivist school believed that the punishment should be determined by
the needs of the individual offender rather than by the seriousness of the
offense. However, while academic and policy discourses underwent substantial
transformations with the rise of positivism at the onset of the twentieth century,
practices were almost certainly slower to do so and, more particularly, remained
more diverse. Moreover, outside the United States the influence of the
individualized sentencing paradigm seems to have been more marginal to actual
sentencing practice. While Raymond Saleilles was preparing his seminal
34
manuscript on The Individualization of Punishment in the 1890s, publications
appearing in Britain were more concerned with disparities in the sentences
35
imposed for the same offenses —suggesting adherence to a more traditional
paradigm.
The individualization of punishment was further promoted at the sentencing
level at the turn of the century by the adoption of such reforms as the invention
36
of the juvenile court, the concept of the pre-sentence report with its implicitly
clinical overtones—and the emergence of the professional role of the probation
37
officers. In Europe, the ideological orientation towards individualized
38
sentences was strengthened by the developing school of social defense, with its
focus on the perpetrator’s dangerousness as a basis for the sentence, and the
emergent laws for habitual, recidivist, and, later, psychopathic offenders—
39
paralleling similar developments in the United States. Under the European
penal system, however, the individualization principle seems not to have eroded
underlying classical principles.
These tensions may be detected in the early empirical research on
sentencing. Empirical research was one of the defining characteristics of the
positivist movement, and was perhaps inspired by a seminal article published by
40
Everson in 1919, followed by a series of publications by Gaudet and his
41
colleagues. A number of studies were conducted around mid-century—

sentencing dictates that the court abides closely by the legal code. Cf. Hugo Adam Bedau & Erin Kelly,
Punishment,
STANFORD
ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF
PHILOSOPHY
(Feb.
19,
2010),
http://www.plato.stanford.edu/entries/punishment/.
34. SALEIILLES, supra note 24.
35. LEON RADZINOWICZ & ROGER HOOD, THE EMERGENCE OF PENAL POLICY IN VICTORIAN
AND EDWARDIAN ENGLAND 741 n.2 (1990) (quoting Anon, The Way of Escape by Death, 976
WHITEHALL REV. 5–6 (1895)).
36. The first juvenile court was established in Cook County, Illinois in 1899. See BLOMBERG &
LUCKEN, supra note 32, at 83–98.
37. Id.
38. See generally MARC ANCEL, SOCIAL DEFENCE (1966).
39. See generally YSABEL F. RENNIE, THE SEARCH FOR CRIMINAL MAN: A CONCEPTUAL
HISTORY OF THE DANGEROUS OFFENDER (1978).
40. George Everson, The Human Element in Justice, 10 J. AM. INST. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 90
(1919).
41. See, e.g., Frederick J. Gaudet, George. S. Harris, & Charles W. St. John, Individual Differences
in the Sentencing Tendencies of Judges, 23 J. AM. INST. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 811 (1933).
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facilitated at this time by the gradual emergence of more sophisticated
42
methodologies, including multivariate analysis and the use of significance tests.
Among these studies was Shoham’s empirical study of the sentencing
objectives of Israel’s district court judges and of the extent of the disparities in
43
their sentencing practice. Other studies, each with its distinctive orientation,
were conducted at this time by Edward Green in the United States, Roger
44
Hood in Britain and, a few years later, by John Hogarth in Canada. Seeing
that, by and large, the positivist penology of this period favored a sentencing
process that was oriented towards the personality and circumstances of the
offender and was opposed to a formalist sentencing philosophy focusing on the
seriousness of the offense, it is of interest to consider why these scholars should
have been so concerned with sentencing disparity: disparities might have been
perceived as an inseparable component of the prevailing rehabilitation model.
A perusal of the research publications at the time suggests that the driving
force for these studies was fascination with the judicial personality and its likely
effect on sentencing outcomes. One factor was the influence of Freudian
psychoanalysis, which led to speculation as to the unconscious drive motivating
judges to punitiveness, as reflected in such works as Alexander and Staub’s The
45
Criminal, the Judge and the Public and Weihofen’s The Urge to Punish. There
was also a growing interest in the work of social psychologists on the impact of
46
social attitudes on public (including legal) policy; this was reflected in the
American realist movement, particularly in the work of Glendon Schubert on
47
“jurimetrics.” These influences were felt in the sentencing studies referred to
here.
While the rehabilitation ideology required that the courts have wide
discretion in their sentencing decisions, the intention was that the choice of
sentence would accord with the characteristics of the individual offender, and
not with the personality of the individual judge. Thus, while the concern with
disparities is today identified with desert-oriented scholarship, it seems that it
was also a concern for these positivist scholars. Unlike the reformers of the
1970s, however, the literature drawing attention to judicial disparities during
the earlier period seems to have been less acutely concerned with issues
42. See, e.g., EDWARD GREEN, JUDICIAL ATTITUDES IN SENTENCING 26–28 (1961).
43. Shlomo Shoham, The Sentencing Policy of Criminal Courts in Israel, 50 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 327 (1959).
44. See GREEN, supra note 42; ROGER HOOD, SENTENCING IN MAGISTRATES’ COURTS: A
STUDY IN VARIATIONS OF POLICY (1962); JOHN HOGARTH, SENTENCING AS A HUMAN PROCESS
(1971). The first of these studies focused on the individual judges in an urban criminal court, the last
two on the variations among magistrates’ courts in widely differing geographical areas. For a review of
earlier studies, see HOGARTH, supra, at 1.
45. FRANZ ALEXANDER & HUGO STAUB, THE CRIMINAL, THE JUDGE AND THE PUBLIC (1956);
HENRY WEIHOFEN, THE URGE TO PUNISH (1956).
46. The earlier study by GAUDET ET AL., supra note 41, seems to have been motivated by
curiosity with regard to individual differences among judges, which in turn was inspired by a study of
exam-marking in an educational setting.
47. See GLENDON A. SCHUBERT, THE JUDICIAL MIND REVISITED (1974).
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48

pertaining to justice and rights —rights consciousness (and the related civil
rights movement) only having begun to emerge as a powerful movement
somewhat after the period in question. Researchers in the earlier period were
rather concerned that the sentence should reflect a “scientific” process, related
to the characteristics of the offender—although also aware of the relevance of
the “legal” offense-related variables. It will be instructive to examine these
studies from this perspective.
49
The seminal study by Gaudet et alia, which seems to have inspired many of
the later studies, was originally titled “A Study of Some Factors Other than
Guilt and Nature of Offense Which Determine the Length of a Prisoner’s
50
Sentence.” The article lists these factors that, in addition to judge-related
variables, include the prisoner’s “marital condition, his color, his race, his
political affiliations . . . the age of the prisoner, his religion, general business
51
conditions, etc.” It might be anticipated that many of these factors would, like
the judge-related factors, be perceived by the authors as non-legitimate
considerations at sentencing. However, later in the article the authors refer to
the judge-related variables as relevant to the question of whether differences in
sentencing tendencies “are to be found outside of the crime and those of the
52
offender.” This formulation seems to imply that this open-ended list of
53
offender-related variables, like the crime-related ones —but unlike those that
were judge-related—was seen to play a legitimate role in the sentencing
decision.
Hood’s study was mainly aimed at describing sentencing patterns by area in
order to determine how far variations are accounted for by geographical
influences, in addition to those factors that might normally be expected to
influence the sentence. The latter category then had to be identified for the
purposes of the study (that is to say, for control purposes). This issue was
addressed by Hermann Mannheim in his introduction:
For technical reasons, not every conceivable factor potentially affecting magisterial
policy can possibly be examined, but there are a number of them which by common
experience form the basis of sentencing, such as the seriousness of the offence, the
number
and kind of previous convictions, work habits, age, marital status, and the
54
like.

48. But see infra note 56 and accompanying text (discussing Hood’s concern with “equality of
consideration”).
49. Gaudet et al., supra note 41.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 813 (emphasis added).
53. A positivist purist might of course argue that crime-related variables should also be irrelevant
to sentencing except insofar as they reflected upon the offender’s personality. See, e.g., FILIPPO
GRAMATICA, PRINCIPES DE DEFENSE SOCIALE (1963); BARBARA WOOTTON, CRIME AND THE
CRIMINAL LAW: REFLECTIONS OF A MAGISTRATE AND SOCIAL SCIENTIST (2d ed. 1981). But most
criminologists probably accepted the “neo-classical” compromise. Cf. SHLOMO SHOHAM, OFFENCES
AND PUNISHMENTS IN ISRAEL 14 (1963) (in Hebrew).
54. Hermann Mannheim, Introduction to HOOD, supra note 44, at xv.
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It will be noted that the list includes offender-related variables such as work
habits, age, and marital status—and that Mannheim’s formulation suggests,
again, that the consideration of these variables in the sentencing decision was
legitimate. Hood’s own list of variables to be taken into account also included
55
“occupation.” He then elaborated the principle of “equality of consideration,”
implying that all such variables could legitimately be taken into consideration as
long as the courts behaved consistently in this respect. He was particularly
concerned as to whether courts were using imprisonment for the same “type” of
56
offender.
Edward Green, in the introduction to his study of sentencing practices in
57
Philadelphia, devotes one section of this chapter to the criteria for sentencing.
These are divided into three categories. The first is entitled “statutory criteria”
and focuses on the provisions of the law. Here he posits that “the law requires
that the punishment fit the crime,” while adding that “the standards of
58
measurement are vague.” His third category is titled “legally irrelevant
criteria.” Here he refers not only to the personality of the judge but also to
“political or journalistic pressures, public hysteria, [and] prejudice against
59
minority groups.” Of particular interest in the present context, however, is his
second category, which he calls “discretionary criteria.” Here he asserts that
“the standards available to the judge for determining the penalty in a given case
60
emanate from the ethical and moral order of which the law is a part.” These
standards “pertain to the circumstances of the criminal act, the characteristics of
the offender, and the attitudes and sentiments of the community towards
61
certain types of crimes or criminals.”
Thus, despite Green’s earlier declaration in relation to the punishment
fitting the crime, offender-related and community-related criteria are also
perceived as a part of the sentencing equation. For the purposes of elaborating
the meaning of “offender-related criteria,” Green cites—apparently with
approval—an article by Judge Theodore Levin, which addresses various
utilitarian considerations relating to the likely effects of different sanctions on
the offender in question, and asks, “Are the offender’s emotional and mental
characteristics, his family ties, and his business interests such as to offer
62
encouragement and hope for his reformation . . . ?” Once again, we see here a
very open-ended (and some would say problematic) account of the variables
designated as relevant; in spite of Green’s apparently clear-cut threefold

55. Id. at 15.
56. Id. at 16.
57. GREEN, supra note 42, at 3–20.
58. Id. at 4.
59. Id. at 6.
60. Id. at 5.
61. Id.
62. Id. (quoting Judge Theodore Levin, Sentencing the Criminal Offender, 13 FED. PROBATION 3,
3–4 (1949).
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categorization of sentencing variables, any attempt to develop a structured
sentencing process based upon this analysis would be fraught with difficulty.
Shoham’s account of the criteria invoked in the sentencing decision was
similar, but less open-ended. In his 1959 article he, too, adopted a three-fold
category for analyzing these criteria: (1) the offense and its circumstances, (2)
63
the offender and his background, and (3) the attitude of the trial judge. The
second category includes “the offender’s economic means and position, his
family, age, social background, physical and mental health,” as well as his
criminal record. The article referred to by Shoham makes no judgment as to
the legitimacy of these variables as determinants of the sentence. Even in his
conclusion, where he refers to the variations among judges that cannot be
explained by offense and offender differences, he leaves open the question of
the “penal or social consequences of these variations” and “to what extent they
64
are remediable.” However, it is clear from other parts of his article that
65
Shoham attributes overriding importance to offender-related considerations.
It has surely become clear that the somewhat vague and open-ended lists of
variables—particularly offender-related variables, which were apparently
perceived by Shoham and his contemporaries as legitimately influencing the
sentencing decision—would present a serious obstacle in any attempt to
introduce a rigid system of structured sentencing, which was not a priority
among these researchers. Even the influence of the identity of the judge on the
sentence, while an object of special fascination to these researchers, seems to
have attracted no more than implicit reservations, if at all.
The “last word” in this line of research studies was surely the wide-ranging
66
and meticulous study by Hogarth of magistrates in Ontario. Conducted a few
years after the other studies mentioned, this study went far beyond its
predecessors in the comprehensiveness and sophistication of its analysis,
67
employing a range of multivariate analyses. Moreover, rather than deducing
the personality differences among his sample from the differences in their
sentencing practices, he studied the attitudes of the magistrates (both in terms
of penal philosophy and other matters) directly, by interviews and attitude
68
questionnaires. Hogarth found that most of the considerable variation in their
sentencing practices could be explained by their personality and attitude
69
differences. Information relating to the magistrates’ attitudes increased a
70
researcher’s power to predict the outcome of a case five- or six-fold.
Sentencing should be seen not as a “black box” that simply translates input

63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Shoham, supra note 43.
Id. at 337.
Id. at 331.
HOGARTH, supra note 44.
Id. at 15–33.
Id. at 27, 103–37.
Id. at 47–165.
Id. at 382.
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variables into appropriate decisions, but rather as a lively interactive locus for
the processing of information in accordance with the magistrate’s personality.
The value-free language of Hogarth’s study is striking. Hogarth expressed
no views of his own on the purposes of sentencing, which he believed to be
beyond the parameters of his study (he found that the dominating purpose of
71
sentencing among the magistrates at that time was reformative), but he did
conclude that outcomes deriving from the personalities of individual
magistrates were “likely to be repugnant to the average man’s sense of
72
justice.”
A remarkable feature of these studies from a contemporary perspective—
particularly striking in relation to Hogarth’s because of its general
comprehensiveness—is the relative lack of interest in socio-demographic
73
variables, particularly race. Nonetheless, a review of the evidence regarding
the role of “non-legal variables” published in 1974 by John Hagan was able to
locate twenty studies from the preceding decades (all from the United States) in
74
which data were presented on these topics.
The somewhat marginal status of court sentencing research at this time may
be explained by the fact that there was almost certainly less interest in judicial
sentencing patterns than in the impact of sentences, both on the offenders on
whom they were imposed (rehabilitation, individual deterrence, and
incapacitation) and on other potential offenders (general deterrence). The
methodologies for such evaluations were continually improving, with the fifty
U.S. states constituting a natural laboratory for cross-jurisdiction comparisons.
The accumulation of research findings on the effects of offender
interventions led to “systematic reviews,” notably by Martinson and his
75
colleagues. The disappointing evidence that emerged from the research fed
into the increasing dissatisfaction with the traditional paradigm as reflected in
the publications of the 1970s referred to above, emphasizing the arbitrariness
and unpredictability of penal practices under this paradigm. As noted earlier,
these perceptions contributed to the acceptance of the new paradigm of just
deserts, to be based upon structured and proportionate sentencing, and
epitomized by the establishment of sentencing commissions and the
introduction of sentencing guidelines.

71. Id. at 73, 288–91.
72. Id. at 386.
73. Green’s study, however, was included in Hagan, infra note 74.
74. John Hagan, Extra-Legal Attributes and Criminal Sentencing: An Assessment of a Sociological
Viewpoint, 8 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 357, 358 (1974). The study can be seen as a pioneering exercise in
meta-analysis in that Hagan re-analyzed the findings of many of the studies he reviewed. On the other
hand, the fact that he found the need to explain somewhat basic statistical interpretations to the
readership (such as the difference between statistical significance and the magnitude of the association)
suggests that familiarity with such methodology was limited at this time.
75. See Martinson, supra note 27 and accompanying text.
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V
THE JUST DESERTS PARADIGM AND ITS AFTERMATH
The new paradigm generated statutory and policy reforms across the United
States, as well as other, mainly common law jurisdictions, and was accompanied
by a vast academic literature. More particularly, in addition to the extensive
76
77
policy debates, the reforms have inspired new waves of empirical research. In
the wake of the disillusion with the consequentialist achievements of the
correctional system under the “outgoing” rehabilitation-oriented paradigm, the
dependent variable on which researchers were now focused was the sentence of
78
the court rather than its social outcomes —in principle a much simpler research
objective. Interest has focused on such issues as whether the elimination of
disparities has been hampered by such institutional obstacles as prosecutorial
79
discretion. The present article, however, focuses on a number of conceptual
issues that may have given rise to uncertainties or constrained the
implementation of the reforms, thereby impeding their evaluation.
A. Process of Reform and its Rationale
Evaluation of the success of any penal reform requires an understanding of
its purposes or rationale, a point that arose in the context of the anecdote
presented at the beginning of this paper. Identification of the rationale may not
seem to be a major problem in the context of the adoption of the just deserts
paradigm and structured sentencing in the United States in the 1970s, the main
aim of which seems to have been the reduction of judicial discretion in order to
reduce disparities among judges. However, beyond the concern with disparities
in general, there was also specific concern regarding discrimination against
minorities, as well as some class and gender concerns. Moreover, some
proponents of these reforms may have had expectations regarding the severity
80
of the sentences—whether an increase or a decrease.
This leads to the question as to how “the purposes” of a penal (or other
legal) reform may be identified. The literature of jurisprudence alludes to the
varied traditions of different legal systems with regard to the interpretation of

76. See, e.g., MICHAEL TONRY, OVERCROWDED TIMES (1989–2000); STITH & CABRANES, supra
note 12; Symposium, Sentencing: What’s at Stake for the States?, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 933–1416 (2005).
77. See, e.g., CASSIA SPOHN, HOW DO JUDGES DECIDE? (2d ed., 2009); The Symposium on Crime
and Justice: The Past and Future of Empirical Sentencing Research, UNIVERSITY OF ALBANY SCHOOL
OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE (2010), http://www.albany.edu/scj/symposium_home.php. For an early attempt
of a comprehensive multi-disciplinary evaluation, see NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, RESEARCH ON
SENTENCING: SEARCH FOR REFORM 1 (1983).
78. Research on the consequentialist objectives of sentencing did not cease entirely, of course, and
was subsequently encouraged by the movement towards “evidence-based” policies. See, e.g., DORIS
MACKENZIE, WHAT WORKS IN CORRECTIONS? (2006).
79. See STITH & CABRANES, supra note 12, 130–42; see also Aharonson, supra note 26.
80. This question has been prominent in the context of the recent Israeli reform, owing to
conflicting indications by Ministry of Justice personnel in this regard, which served to enhance
opposition to its adoption among liberals.
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legislation, focusing on the legislative texts, preambles and travaux
81
préparatoires. This task was realistic in an era when law reform was primarily a
matter of government initiatives based on the advice of “experts,” and the
reports of public and professional committees (characteristics of the positivist
era considered in the previous section), and when societies were culturally more
homogeneous. Today, legislation in many societies rather reflects the activities
and initiatives of individual parliamentarians (especially if introduced as private
members’ bills), the media, and innumerable interest groups, NGOs, moral
82
entrepreneurs, and other components of civil society. Legislation might also be
83
the product of a political deal. These phenomena may render identification of
the rationale even more problematic.
B. Sentencing Philosophy
While the sentencing philosophy incorporated in the reform will inevitably
be related to the reform’s rationale, the former is more likely to be specified
explicitly in the legislation—or the sentencing guidelines, if any. Such reference
to specific sentencing purposes does not, however, ensure clarity and the purity
of a particular sentencing paradigm.
As indicated above, academic tradition identifies the contemporary
structured sentencing movement with a retributivist or desert philosophy—
more specifically the “just deserts” model as espoused in Doing Justice and the
84
other writings of Andrew von Hirsch. This view, however, has by no means
been universally accepted by policy-makers. Notoriously, the U.S. Congress’s
enabling statute saw sentencing guidelines as being consistent with all the
85
traditional aims of sentencing. Another approach has been to adopt “limiting
86
retributivism” as the guiding philosophy, which, in effect, also opens the door
87
to a variety of consequentialist aims. The English model of structured
sentencing adopted in 1991 (since amended) and the Israeli model have

81. See, e.g., Jerry L. Marshaw, Textualism, Constitutionalism, and the Interpretation of Federal
Statutes, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV 827 (1991).
82. For studies illustrating two contrasting legislative processes (although both oriented towards
victims), see CANDACE MCCOY, POLITICS AND PLEA-BARGAINING (1993); PAUL ROCK, HELPING
VICTIMS OF CRIME (1990). AHARONSON, supra note 26, argues that the more populist characteristics
referred to here and other features of “direct democracy” are what distinguish U.S. legislative
processes from those of Europe.
83. In a sense this is true of the federal sentencing reform of 1984, which was adopted as a result of
an informal coalition between supporters of reform from among both Democrats and Republicans. See
STITH & CABRANES, supra note 12, 33–77.
84. See ANDREW VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE (1976); see also ANDREW VON HIRSCH, PAST OR
FUTURE CRIMES (1985).
85. STITH & CABRANES, supra note 12, at 48–59.
86. Richard Frase, Limiting Retributivism, in THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT 83 (Michael Tonry
ed., 2004).
87. Limiting retributivism sets the upper (and some would say lower) limits for the sanction
according to desert principles, but subject to these limits consequentialist aims may be applied in
determining the sentence.
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88

attempted to structure the relationship as among the various aims. However,
the multiplicity of aims under the federal model, the adoption of a hybrid
model, or the superimposition of extraneous sentencing norms such as “Three
Strikes” legislation may further impede the possibility of evaluating the extent
to which the implementation of the reform has been successful.
C. Desert and the Components of Offense Seriousness
Even desert purists, who would link the sentence exclusively with offense
89
seriousness—defined as comprising harm and culpability —are not in
agreement as to the precise identity of these components. The relevance of
90
various surrounding circumstances remains in dispute.
Particularly
91
controversial has been the degree of relevance of the offender’s prior record.
Clarity on the question of the relevance of such variables is critical to evaluative
research, because variance in sentencing patterns will only be designated as
sentencing “disparity” where it is attributable to factors held to be normatively
irrelevant. Even under a desert-oriented scheme (ostensibly focusing
exclusively on the seriousness of the offense) policy-makers may be tempted to
take into account personal characteristics of the offender—for example via the
“back door” of their linkage to culpability. Disadvantaged background may be
92
a case in point.
Uncertainty with respect to the components of offense seriousness may
hamper the attempt to assess the success of the law in giving rise to “just”
sentencing. The problem is inevitably exacerbated where the reform
93
additionally provides for the adoption of consequentialist rationales, even
where restricted to special cases defined in the statutory norm, as under the
English legislation of 1991 and the new Israeli law, since the criteria for opting
for these rationales are somewhat open-ended, and rely upon assessments of
94
future conduct.
88. See infra Part V.C.
89. VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE, supra note 84, at 79.
90. See RICHARD SINGER, JUST DESERTS: SENTENCING BASED ON EQUALITY AND DESERT, at
xvii (1979) (“As the work itself demonstrates, there is no consensus among commensurate deserts
theorists themselves on the implementation of the philosophy.”)
91. See generally PREVIOUS CONVICTIONS AT SENTENCING: THEORETICAL AND APPLIED
PERSPECTIVES (Julian V. Roberts & Andrew von Hirsch eds., 2010).
92. Cf. Barbara Hudson, Punishing the Poor: Dilemmas of Justice and Difference, in FROM
SOCIAL JUSTICE TO CRIMINAL JUSTICE: POVERTY AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL LAW
189 (William C. Heffernan & John Kleinig eds., 2000).
93. See supra Part V.B.
94. The English law provided for non-commensurate sentencing on the grounds of preventing
future serious harm by the offender. Criminal Justice Act, 1991, c.53 § 2(2)(b) (U.K.). Israel’s Penal
Law now provides that the court may depart (downwards) from the range of “appropriate” sentences
under section 40D where “the defendant has been rehabilitated or there is a real chance that he will be
rehabilitated,” and (upwards) under section 40E “where there is a real fear that the offender will
recidivate.” In the latter case there is a proviso that the upward departure should not substantially
exceed the “appropriate sentencing range.” Even circumscribed by conditions, however, these criteria
will remain vague.
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D. Severity of Punishment
Under retributivist (or desert) theory, the punishment must be proportional
to the crime, a principle reflected in much of the relevant jurisprudence, both
domestic and international, although more rarely explicit in the relevant
95
legislation. Retribution in sentencing, with its Kantian associations, connotes
certainty, and—as indicated earlier—the main reason for the adoption of this
paradigm was to provide clarity in sentencing. However, although the
scholarship of penology and penal philosophy offers solutions to the question of
“ordinal” proportionality (whereby the severity of the sentence will increase
with the seriousness of the offense), as illustrated by the work of von Hirsch and
96
Jareborg on “gauging seriousness,” satisfactory solutions have not been
offered for determining the level of severity in absolute terms (“cardinal”
97
severity). Although desert is a normative theory par excellence, it is not a
unitary theory and is underpinned by a variety of theoretical rationales, such as
98
censure and the “benefits and burden” theory. The few desert philosophers
who have expressed views on the quantum issue offer diverse sentencing ranges,
99
varying from the talionic to the very moderate penalty scale put forward by
100
von Hirsch in Doing Justice, and reference to “community values” as the
yardstick may aggravate the problem of determining the appropriate sentencing
101
level rather than resolve it. Thus, no theoretically founded guidance has been
available as to the appropriate level of the sentencing scale, and guideline
commissions have to choose between using existing practice as their point of
102
departure (“descriptive guidelines”), or somewhat arbitrary innovations
(“prescriptive guidelines”). Similarly, a statutory provision exhorting the courts

95. Richard Frase, Comparative Perspectives on Sentencing Policy and Research, in SENTENCING
259 (Michael Tonry & Richard S. Frase eds. 2001). Sweden
is seen as an exception in this respect in specifying the principle and elaborating its components. See
ASHWORTH, supra note 10, at 4. The recent Israeli reform, which adopts “appropriateness” as the
underlying principle, follows a similar pattern. See Penal Law, 5737-1977, § 40B (1977) (Isr.).
96. Andrew von Hirsch & Nils Jareborg, Gauging Criminal Harm: A Living-Standard Analysis, 11
O.J.L.S. 1 (1991).
97. See Leslie Sebba (with Iris Weinrib), Sentencing Severity in Search of a Theory, 3 HUKIM 99
(2011) (Isr.).
98. See Antony Duff, Legal Punishment, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Apr. 14,
2008), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/legal-punishment.
99. See, e.g., IGOR PRIMORATZ, JUSTIFYING LEGAL PUNISHMENT 79–81 (1997) (“On the question
of the measure of punishment, retributivism entails the lex talionis [of Roman law]: as the offender has
done, so it should be done to him.”).
100. VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE, supra note 84.
101. See infra Part V.F. For possible techniques, see Andrew von Hirsch, Seriousness, Severity and
the Living Standard, in PRINCIPLED SENTENCING 143 (Andrew von Hirsch, Andrew Ashworth &
Julian Roberts eds., 3d ed. 2009); David Indermaur, Dealing the Public In: Challenges for a Transparent
and Accountable Sentencing Policy, in PENAL POPULISM, SENTENCING COUNCILS AND SENTENCING
POLICY 45 (Arie Freiberg & Karen Gelb eds. 2008).
102. See Richard S. Frase, State Sentencing Guidelines: Diversity, Consensus, and Unresolved Policy
Issues, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1190 (2005).
AND SANCTIONS IN WESTERN COUNTRIES
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to impose a proportionate or “appropriate” sentence
evaluation in terms of “success.”
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is not easily given to

E. Sentencing Procedures and Extraneous Influences
Sentencing research in common law countries has generally been reliant for
its sources on records generated by the traditional role-players in the system —
judges, prosecutors, defense attorneys, and probation officers—in accordance
with standardized procedures. The structured character of the system gave rise
104
to a sense of predictability as to the possible variables affecting the sentence.
It should be recalled, however, that the just deserts movement was
105
accompanied or closely followed by the victims’ rights movement, and recent
decades have increasingly recognized the victim’s right to input in the criminal
process in adversarial systems, notably by means of victim-impact statements—
106
and in some U.S. jurisdictions, victim statements of opinion. The link between
just deserts and victim-related considerations is not prima facie inconsistent,
victim harm being a primary component of offense seriousness. However, the
possible emotional overtones and vengeful or otherwise idiosyncratic views of
107
victims may detract from the predictability of the sentencing outcome.
It is also widely believed that courts are influenced by media pressure, and
what is presumed to reflect “public opinion.” Judges do not want to be viewed
as “out of touch,” and their supposed need for “public trust” is sometimes
108
incorporated into the formal legal norm. In cases of criminal victimization
involving race, gender, class, or other topics of public interest, feelings may run
high and pressure may be exerted. This may be enhanced by NGO or other civil
society activity, which may in turn interact with the media or the victim. Such
variables may impact sentencing decisions, but are unlikely to be taken into
account by sentencing researchers.
F. Reference Groups
Desert sentencing posits that the offender will receive his or her due: the
sentence to be imposed is that which “fits the crime”—and that others would

103. Cf. Frase, supra note 95 and accompanying text.
104. The procedures, however (and more particularly the rules of evidence), were much more
flexible at sentencing than at the trial stage—an issue only partly addressed by recent Supreme Court
jurisprudence. See Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 311 (2004).
105. The First International Symposium on Victimology was held in 1973, precisely the period in
which the key publications identified with the advent of the just deserts movement were appearing.
106. See DOUGLAS E. BELOOF, PAUL G. CASSELL, & STEVEN J. TWIST, VICTIMS IN CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE 625–67 (3d ed., 2010).
107. Leslie Sebba, Sentencing and the Victim: The Aftermath of Payne, 3 INT’L REV. VICTIMOLOGY
141 (1994).
108. On the attempts by sentencing commissions and sentencing councils to take public opinion
into account in norm-setting, see ARIE FREIBERG & KAREN GELB, PENAL POPULISM, SENTENCING
COUNCILS AND SENTENCING POLICY (2008).
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receive in the same situation. It is this feature above all that distinguishes the
109
just deserts model from the individualization model that preceded it.
110
But who are the “others” to whom this equalization principle applies? The
interest of sentencing researchers in the extent to which sentencing practices
reflect the values of the local community (thus by implication legitimizing
within-jurisdiction geographical variation) dates back to the positivist tradition
111
of the mid-twentieth century and continues to generate positive findings in
112
contemporary sentencing research, as well as attracting support. Yet in a postmodern world of identity politics and diverse cultures, even local communities
may lack a Durkheimian consensus as to the degree of censure “deserved” for a
particular offense.
On the other hand, not only does desert theory, with its Kantian
113
associations, seem to presuppose that there is a just (or “appropriate”)
sentence for every crime, but the development of international human rights
norms, in particular the creation of international institutions for dispensing
penal justice such as the International Criminal Court and the various ad hoc
114
tribunals, indicates an orientation towards universally approved sanctions.
However, while liberal doctrine identified with the promotion of the just deserts
model might support such an orientation, the practice of domestic penal
115
systems reveals substantial variation in their levels of penality.
The next section will take a brief look at the research literature relating to
the reforms generated under the just deserts paradigm and in the aftermath of
the paradigm’s adoption, noting indications of interpretational or other
problems deriving from the conceptual or methodological issues that have been
raised here.

109. But see R.A. Duff, Guidance and Guidelines, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1162 (2005). Duff, although
an adherent to desert philosophy, would allow the penalty to be negotiated in the individual case
between judge, offender, and victim though a communicative process.
110. The issue here is possible differentiation not among perpetrators, which was referred in Part
V.C, supra, but among sanctioning agencies.
111. Cf. HOOD, supra note 44.
112. See JOHN H. KRAMER & JEFFERY T. ULMER, SENTENCING GUIDELINES: LESSONS FROM
PENNSYLVANIA (2009).
113. Cf. supra note 94.
114. While most of the relevant international human rights conventions deal only with penal
excesses such as torture and inhumane or degrading punishment, The Convention on the Rights of the
Child, G.A. Res. 44/25 ¶ 40, U.N. Doc. A/RES/44/25 (Sept. 2, 1990) refers explicitly to proportionality.
115. See infra Part VII; Aharonson, supra note 26. On the potential for increased universalization
of sanctioning norms, see Frase, supra note 95; Leslie Sebba, Punitiveness in International Criminal
Justice: Some Explorations, in INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON PUNITIVITY 187 (Helmut Kury &
Theodore Ferdinand eds., 2008).
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VI
RESEARCH FINDINGS—AMBIVALENCE AND AMBIGUITIES
116

During the thirty-five years since the publication of Doing Justice in 1976,
more than twenty U.S. states—in addition to the federal system—have
117
reformed their sentencing system by means of a “guideline” system, and some
118
developments of this type have occurred outside the United States.
Sentencing commissions have been charged with conducting research (or have
chosen to do so) in order to monitor the effects of the reforms. There have also
been numerous evaluation initiatives by other agencies and academics.
Clearly no serious attempt can be made in a few lines even to summarize the
findings of these publications. However, the impression gleaned from the more
119
comprehensive overviews, including such sources as Spohn, Kramer and
120
Ulmer’s recent study of the sentencing reforms in Pennsylvania, and Michael
121
Tonry’s well-known overview Sentencing Matters, is that scholars perceive the
research findings to be equivocal as to the extent to which the reforms have
122
while the researchers
achieved their objectives (hence ambiguities),
themselves seem to be ambivalent as to what can or should be done about it.
Although some positive findings are reported—particularly in relation to the
reforms in Minnesota and Pennsylvania—doubts generally remain, inter alia, as
123
to the extent to which disparities and discrimination have been reduced, and
to the extent to which the courts have taken into account “extralegal” variables.
Differences by localities are also widely reported.
More specifically, Spohn reports on a meta-analysis conducted by Mitchell
in 2005, which “revealed that the amount of unwarranted disparity in
124
sentencing had not changed appreciably since the 1970s”; and Tonry puts
forward detailed arguments as to why the claims of sentencing commissions that
they have succeeded in reducing disparity should be doubted. In her earlier
publication, which focuses specifically on racial discrimination, Spohn
concludes:
The fact that racial discrimination persists despite these policy changes suggests that
reformers may have had unrealistic expectations about the ability of the reforms to

116. VON HIRSCH, supra note 84.
117. See Frase, supra note 102. Some states introduced such a system but subsequently repealed it.
118. See Indermaur, supra note 101 .
119. SPOHN, supra note 77; see also Cassia C. Spohn, Thirty Years of Sentencing Reform: The Quest
for a Racially Neutral Sentencing Process, in 3 POLICIES, PROCESSES AND DECISIONS OF THE
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 427 (2000); Julian V. Roberts, Structured Sentencing Outside the United
States, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIMINOLOGY AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE (forthcoming).
120. KRAMER & ULMER, supra note 112.
121. MICHAEL TONRY, SENTENCING MATTERS (1996).
122. Of course since it may not be clear what precisely were the objectives of the reform, the issues
discussed (for example, elimination of discrimination) may rather reflect the agenda of the researcher.
123. These doubts seemed to be shared by Aharonson, supra note 26, at 181.
124. SPOHN, supra note 77, at 190.
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alter the sentencing process
and/or that the reforms themselves have not been
125
implemented as intended.

All these authors question the failure of guidelines to take into account what
they perceive to be relevant variables—thus questioning the concept of “legal”
126
variables. Tonry claims that the just deserts approach fails “to ‘treat different
127
cases differently.’” Kramer and Ulmer, too, believe that substantive (as
distinct from formal) justice would be achieved by greater flexibility in the
guidelines. Paternoster, however, claims in a recent article that guidelines do
indeed reduce disparities and that relaxation of the mandatory force of the
federal guidelines has been shown to have increased disparities—attributing
arguments to the contrary to the antipathy of their advocates to the supposed
128
punitiveness of guideline policies.
One can only speculate as to how far uncertainties regarding the outcome of
the sentencing reforms derive from the complexities of sentencing research
alluded to above, from unsatisfactory features attaching to the reforms in
question, or from obstacles to implementation—such as resistance on the part
129
of key role-players in the criminal justice system or of “court cultures.” It
should be noted, however, that academic analysis has been devoted specifically
130
to the impact on the research findings in this area of the methodology applied.
Finally, while it is undoubtedly true that since the change in the sentencing
paradigm in the 1970s incarceration rates in the United States have dramatically
increased, a widely-held view that this increase is attributable to the sentencing
131
132
guidelines
has been challenged.
The causes of punitiveness and its
relationship to sentencing policies will be further considered in the next section.
VII
PUNITIVENESS AND ITS CORRELATES
Soaring rates of imprisonment in the United States (the “mass
incarceration” phenomenon), coupled with the publication of “league tables” of

125. SPOHN, supra note 119, at 427.
126. Id. at 142. For further discussion of this topic, see supra note 18 and accompanying text.
127. TONRY, supra note 121, at 14.
128. Raymond Paternoster, Racial Disparity under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines Pre- and PostBooker: Lessons Not Learned from Research on the Death Penalty, 10 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y
1063 (2011).
129. With reference to the prosecution, see supra note 79 and accompanying text.
130. Weisburd, supra note 14; Belinda Rodgers McCarthy & Charles A. Lindquist, Ambiguity and
Conflict in Sentencing Research: Partial Resolution Through Crime-Specific Analysis, 13 J. CRIM. JUST.
155 (1985).
131. It may be that this view is more widely held outside the United States. It has certainly fuelled
the arguments of opponents. See Boaz Sangero, Who is Interested in More and Longer Prison
Sentences? On the Penal Law (Amendment: Structuring of Judicial Discretion in Sentencing) Bill, 2005, 5
ALEI MISHPAT 247 (2006) (Isr.); see also Oren Gazal-Ayal & Rutie Lazar, Anticipated Outcomes of
Departure Sentences, 3 HUKIM 41 (2011) (Isr.).
132. See Kevin Reitz, Don’t Blame Determinacy: U.S. Incarceration Growth Has Been Driven by
Other Forces, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1787 (2006).
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prison populations per 100,000 population around the world, have provoked a
strong interest among criminologists in identifying the roots of punitiveness and
thus explaining the differences observed between nations and cultures. The
debate has been further stimulated by the comparative analyses of Whitman,
134
Cavadino and Dignan, and Lacey. While Whitman emphasized historicocultural factors, the other studies attributed considerable significance to the
political economy of the nations compared. Under the typology of Cavadino
and Dignan, the most punitive nations in their sample were those that had
adopted neoliberal economies (the United States, England, South Africa, and
New Zealand); in the middle were the “corporatist” states of western Europe;
135
and the least punitive were the social democracies of Scandinavia. The
connection between the economic regime and punitiveness has been explained
in terms of the economic insecurities and other fears related to globalization
and migration policies that are perceived as being more threatening in
neoliberal societies where the welfare infrastructure is more tenuous; and
politicians—with the assistance of the media—have been accused of
manipulating the public’s concerns, thereby fostering the fear of victimization,
136
suspicion of “the other,” and the need to be “tough on crime.”
This idea that punitiveness may be connected with a nation’s social,
political, economic, or cultural patterns or orientations is of course not new.
Durkheim’s thesis that societies would move from repressive to restitutive
137
norms was further supplemented by his “Two Laws of Penal Evolution.”
Rusche and Kirchheimer explained the prevailing forms of punishment in terms
of economic interests, while Elias—and to some extent Foucault—emphasized
138
cultural characteristics. Tonry, however, who has written extensively on
developments in penal policy, including “American exceptionalism,” attributes
the punitiveness of the United States to the excessively populist character of its
139
democratic institutions —a thesis further developed in this symposium by Ely
140
Aharonson. Examples of this are electoral primaries, the use of referenda, and
the election of judges and prosecutors. These phenomena contrast with the
modifying effects of the professional bureaucracies charged with policy-making
in European governmental departments. Savelsberg emphasizes the role of the

133. ROY WALMSLEY, WORLD PRISON POPULATION LIST (8th ed., 2009).
134. See MICHAEL CAVADINO & JAMES DIGNAN, PENAL SYSTEMS: A COMPARATIVE APPROACH
(2006); NICOLA LACEY, THE PRISONERS’ DILEMMA (2008); JAMES Q. WHITMAN, HARSH JUSTICE:
CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT AND THE WIDENING DIVIDE BETWEEN AMERICA AND EUROPE (2003).
135. Less punitive still was Japan, but Japan was considered sui generis among the group and
designated “oriental corporatist.”
136. Cf. DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL (2001).
137. For example, see ALAN HUNT, THE SOCIOLOGICAL MOVEMENT IN LAW 68–72, 79–85 (1978)
138. An in-depth analysis of some of these theories is found in DAVID GARLAND, PUNISHMENT
AND MODERN SOCIETY (1990).
139. Michael Tonry, Determinants of Penal Policies, in 36 CRIME, PUNISHMENT, AND POLITICS IN
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 1 (Michael Tonry ed., 2007).
140. Aharonson, supra note 26.
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state in these societies in generating knowledge and determining priorities in
141
this field, while Garland and Sparks note that the irrationality of penal
policies in neoliberal states can be explained by the fact that crime and
punishment have become too important to politicians for them to leave policy
142
formation in this field to professionals (such as criminologists).
These analyses raise profound issues in relation to both the dynamics and
substance of penal reform. While early positivist criminology was characterized
by its deterministic approach to criminality and confidence that researching the
causes would enable experts to prescribe the appropriate criminal justice
policies, the literature on the origins of punitiveness suggests that in neoliberal
countries today, criminal justice policy, of which sentencing policy must be
143
considered an integral part,
is itself increasingly determined by external or
constraining forces over which the actors in the system have little influence. The
control of criminal justice policy-making by the professional bureaucracy in
these countries has declined; and its subjection to the vicissitudes of mediasensitive politicians could surely be a contributing factor to the unpredictability
of sentencing policies and their outcomes.
VIII
CONCLUDING REFLECTIONS
This article opened with an account of a “legal transplant” or policy
transfer, which served to illustrate the uncertainties that arise in the course of
attempts to achieve penal reform—particularly sentencing reform, including
uncertainties as to its objectives. The article then pursued the theme of
uncertainties which arise in the course of research on sentencing—particularly
when attempting to evaluate its reform. It focused on the obstacles deriving
from the almost limitless number of variables potentially affecting the
sentencing decision, which may frustrate the implementation of reforms as well
as their evaluation. Uncertainties associated with the open-ended
individualization of the sentencing model of the positivist era have been
replaced, or perhaps supplemented, by new uncertainties accompanying the
adoption of the just deserts paradigm and its aftermath.
Analyses of the research findings derived from the evaluations of desertrelated reforms in the United States indicated at least ambivalence, if not
dissatisfaction, with outcomes. The literature on punitiveness pointed to societal
forces that may be impacting sentencing structures in unpredictable directions.
This same literature, however, indicates that many of the characteristics of
penality and penal reform referred to in this article may be socio-culturally or
141. Joachim Savelsberg, Punitiveness in Cross-National Comparison: Toward a Historically and
Institutionally Founded Multi-factorial Approach, in INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON PUNITIVITY
13 (Helmut Kury & Theodore Ferdinand eds., 2008).
142. David Garland & Richard Sparks, Criminology, Social Theory, and the Challenge of Our
Times, in CRIMINOLOGY AND SOCIAL THEORY 1 (David Garland & Richard Sparks eds., 2000).
143. On the autonomy of sentencing policies, see infra Part VIII.C.
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politically determined, and pertain primarily to so-called neoliberal societies.
Comparative materials from Germany and Scandinavia serve to add credence
144
to this impression.
Given the problematic picture emerging from both historical and
contemporary accounts of sentencing reform and sentencing research in the
United States and other neoliberal countries, coupled with the complex patterns
of national or cultural diversity, it may be appropriate to consider new
theoretical frameworks (or revise old ones) in an endeavor to enhance our
comprehension of current developments. By comparison with the proliferation
of research on sentencing outcomes in recent years, there may be room for
more theoretical writing on the sentencing process, as well as on the processes
of sentencing reform. Some possible directions will be indicated.
A. Modeling the Dynamics of Sentencing Reform
While there has been extensive literature on penal policy-making in recent
years, particularly in the context of punitiveness and mass incarceration, there is
nevertheless room for more systematic research that would focus on the manner
in which reforms (and in the present context, sentencing reforms) emerge and
are debated, identifying the respective roles of government departments,
legislators, NGOs, the public, and the media. This appears to have been
recognized in a recent article by Lynch that triggered a symposium in
Criminology and Public Policy, in which she seeks a new theoretical framework
in order to understand the relationship between the local and the national in
145
mass incarceration. Lynch criticizes researchers for focusing on the outcome
of policy changes “with little attention given to the conditions and contexts in
146
which sentencing laws were devised or transformed.”
Systemic accounts of legislative reforms could be supplemented by the indepth ethnographic methodologies employed by Paul Rock when researching
the emergence of victim policy in Canada and the United Kingdom in an earlier
147
era. Insights emerging from such research could produce models that might
improve our understanding of the dynamics of sentencing reforms and their
related outcomes.
B. Sentencing Decision-Making Processes
The debates on the structuring of sentencing may have diverted our
attention from its core element—the decision-making process of the judge. This

144. See Hans-Jörg Albrecht, Sentencing in Germany: Explaining Long-term Stability in the
Structure of Criminal Sanctions and Sentencing, 76 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS, no. 1, 2013 at 211; Tapio
Lappi-Seppala, Penal Policy in Scandinavia, in CRIME, PUNISHMENT, AND POLITICS IN COMPARATIVE
PERSPECTIVE, supra note 139, at 217.
145. Mona Lynch, Mass Incarceration, Legal Change, and Locale: Understanding and Remediating
American Penal Indulgence, 10 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y. 673 (2011).
146. Id. at 677.
147. ROCK, supra note 82; PAUL ROCK, A VIEW FROM THE SHADOWS (1986).
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was the focus of the early studies under the individualization paradigm, when
discretion was almost unlimited. Hogarth’s sophisticated analysis of the
Canadian magistrates at that time gave rise to a model in which the key to
predicting the outcome was an understanding of how the individual judge would
interpret the facts of the case in the light of “the social system and other
148
features of the external world.” The recent study by Kramer and Ulmer, on
the other hand, focused on a variety of court-level, community-level, state-level
149
and “society-wide” factors. As in the case of policy-making models, in an age
of globalized media, the sentencing model must reflect an ever-widening
spectrum of agencies with potential influence over the outcome. Hogath’s
model, whereby it is the judge at the end of the day who will process the
information, should be incorporated. Since many of the influences affecting the
decision will not be reflected in the formalized sentencing structure, the
tensions observed by Kramer and Ulmer between formal and informal
rationality will come into play. Alternative processes for reaching a decision
within the model developed could serve as a basis for research on the perceived
legitimacy of different procedural options—as well as the decisional outcomes
likely to follow therefrom.
C. Sentencing Autonomy
The discourse on sentencing generally seems to regard the choices faced by
sentencing policy as autonomous. The literature on punitiveness, however,
points to a deterministic dynamic: if your nation has a neoliberal regime, or
your state elects its judges, incarceration rates will increase.
There are essentially two issues here. The first is whether sentencing
patterns can change irrespective of other components of the criminal justice
150
“system.” Opponents of sentencing guidelines claim that discretion “lost” to
judges emerges elsewhere. The second is whether the criminal justice system is
in itself a reflection of other socio-political indicators, as indicated above.
Interdependence between sentencing and other institutions—whether part of
the criminal justice system or otherwise—would certainly account for the failure
of “transplants” when a legal institution is imported from a different type of
legal or socio-political system. Teubner, on the other hand, perceives the failure
of transplants as a natural concomitant of his belief that the law is an
151
autopoietic system —self-referential and normatively closed, but cognitively
open to its environment. The differences in their social settings give rise to
incompatibilities between legal systems such that legal transfers serve as “legal

148. HOGARTH, supra note 44, at 343.
149. See KRAMER & ULMER, supra note 112 and accompanying text.
150. The term “system” suggests it cannot—but the terminology has been challenged. See generally
LUCIA ZEDNER, CRIMINAL JUSTICE 20 (2004).
151. GUNTHER TEUBNER, LAW AS AN AUTOPOIETIC SYSTEM (1993). The theory is biological in
origin and was applied to social systems by Niklas Luhmann.
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152

irritants” causing unpredictable changes in the recipient system.
The implications of this theory for sentencing reforms in a volatile political
153
environment are unclear. Wandall adopted the above theoretical framework
for a study of sentencing in Denmark in the belief that it was particularly suited
to elucidating the rule-oriented sentencing reforms in contemporary legal
154
systems, specifically citing guideline systems. Nevertheless, consistent with the
cognitive openness of the theory, “court organization provides space for . . .
155
courts [to] respond to local social and political pressures.”
Replication of the study in the United States and other settings may produce
insights regarding such issues as the relative weighting of legally-specified
variables versus other variables within the different systems, as well as the role
of reforms. The qualitative methodology of such studies could prove
particularly insightful.
D. Changing Paradigms or Postmodern Chaos?
Insofar as the research considered earlier casts doubt on the ability of the
desert model to reduce disparities in sentencing—might this give rise to a
156
change in paradigm? A revival of interest in consequentialist objectives
157
(especially rehabilitation) was noted earlier, although not necessarily as the
158
basis of a new sentencing structure. Desert sentencing may be more
159
threatened by the desire to enhance victims’ rights or the growing interest in
160
restorative justice.
Given, however, the populist and somewhat arbitrary character of the penal
policies taking place in some western countries (whether or not we choose, with
161
Garland, to describe these features as late modernity), the likelihood of

152. See Gunther Teubner, Legal Irritants: Good Faith in British Law or How Unifying Law Ends
up in New Divergencies, 61 MOD. L. REV. 11, 15 (1998); see also Roger Cotterrell, Comparatists and
Sociology, in COMPARATIVE LEGAL STUDIES: TRADITIANS AND TRANSITIONS 131 (Pierre Legrand &
R.J.C. Munday eds., 2003).
153. It should be observed that insofar as the reform involves a borrowing (or transplanting), this
has usually been from a legal system belonging to the same “family.”
154. RASMUS H. WANDALL, DECISIONS TO IMPRISON: COURT DECISION-MAKING INSIDE AND
OUTSIDE THE LAW 18 (2008).
155. Id. at 17.
156. The term paradigm is, again, used here loosely. Cf. supra note 19. However, the idea of
changing the paradigm because of doubts arising from the accumulation of research findings is, of
course, close to the Kuhnian application of this concept.
157. See supra note 78.
158. Research findings related to the effectiveness of rehabilitation programs are based on
categories of offenders rather than individual pathologies and can largely be implemented within a
structured sentencing scheme.
159. See supra notes 106–107 and accompanying text.
160. See, e.g., HANDBOOK OF RESTORATIVE JUSTICE (Gerry Johnstone & Daniel W. Van Ness,
eds., 2007). Restorative justice has been conceptually developed as an alternative to just deserts. See
JOHN BRAITHWAITE & PHILIP PETTIT: NOT JUST DESERTS: A REPUBLICAN THEORY OF CRIMINAL
JUSTICE (1990).
161. Gardland, supra note 17 and accompanying text.
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cohesion around a new model that can be effectively translated into
government policies seems unlikely, and the academic literature reviewed
above relating to neoliberal regimes and the United States in particular surely
indicates quite another direction. Garland and Sparks note that the pace of
change renders our “long established research agendas . . . outmoded and
162
irrelevant.”
The uncertainty and unpredictability that seem to characterize sentencing
are qualities emphasized in chaos theory. According to Milovanovic “chaos
theory has emerged as one of the key threads of postmodern analysis that
163
fundamentally challenges the assumption of an orderly world.” However,
“chaos should not . . . be seen as purely randomness and chance events: rather,
‘what makes chaos confounding is the way measurement uncertainties
164
expand.’” Classified as a mode of non-linear analysis pertaining to complex
165
system science, chaos theory has been applied to a variety of legal and
166
criminological contexts in the past two decades, including judicial decision167
making. While it may be difficult, on the one hand, to isolate this theory from
its anchorage in the physical sciences or, on the other, to separate it from other
related concepts pertaining to postmodernism, the hypothesis that “seemingly
insignificant events can sometimes have a major impact on the long-term
168
behavior of systems” is surely worth testing in the sentencing context. The
idea that a minor detail could skew the outcome of a case would be the obverse
of Sudnow’s well-known thesis whereby the processing of cases becomes
169
standardized on the basis of a small number of significant variables.
In conclusion, it is suggested that, given the many imponderables of
sentencing reform and sentencing research, the time may be ripe for sentencing
scholars to take a “time out” for a period of stock-taking and the exploration of
170
theoretical modeling, whether on the lines suggested or otherwise.

162. Garland & Sparks, supra note 142, at 21.
163. Milavonovic, supra note 1, at vii.
164. Id. (citing D. PEAK & M. FRAME, CHAOS UNDER CONTROL 158 (1994)).
165. Jeffery T. Walker, Advancing Science and Research in Criminal Justice/Criminology: Complex
Systems Theory and Non-Linear Analyses, 24 JUST. Q. 555, 557 (2007).
166. Milovanovic, supra note 1, at viii.
167. Caren Schulman, Chaos, Law and Critical Legal Studies: Mapping the Terrain, in CHAOS,
CRIMINOLOGY AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 123 (Dragan Milovanovic ed., 1997).
168. Glenn D. Walters, Crime and Chaos: Applying Nonlinear Dynamic Principles to Problems in
Criminology, 43 INT’L J. OFFENDER THERAPY & COMP. CRIMINOLOGY 134, 137(1999).
169. David Sudnow, Normal Crimes, 12 SOC. PROBS. 255 (1965).
170. For other possible theoretical frameworks see KRAMER & ULMER, supra note 112, who
applied Weberian theory, and Ralph Henham, Problems of Theorizing Sentencing Research, 28 INT’L J.
SOC. L. 15 (2000), who applied Giddens’ structuration theory.

